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THE INVISIBLE BARBECUE
Eben Moglen*
Past legislation subsidizing the development of infrastructural technol-
ogy has borne the mark of political corruption. The subject matter of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 falls within the same category of legislation
that has fallen prey to this process in the past. In an effort to discern whether
such forces are at work today, Professor Moglen undertakes a critical exami-
nation of the metaphors that pervade the current scholarly discourse on the
subject of telecommunications law. Terms such as "Superhighway," "Broad-
casting," and "Market for Eyeballs" reveal a great deal about the implicit
assumptions at work behind the current scholarship and legislation, and
serve to confine the debate in such a way that the full impact of the new law
remains hidden. Professor Moglen concludes that the broader implications of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 need to be addressed, or the law will
have a detrimental impact on our society and culture for decades to come.
I. A SPECIAL MISE-EN-SCtNE
Having mobilized its economic power beyond any previous experi-
ence, and having triumphed in a long and sometimes uncertain war, the
United States found itself with almost unbounded opportunities for the
exploitation of new infrastructure technology across a vast geographic
range. The single dominant organization in determining the shape of
the postwar economic reorganization-and the exploitation of the new
infrastructure-would be the federal government itself. Its control of es-
sential public resources, said conventionally to be held in trust for the
people, empowered it to decide the most basic features of the new polit-
ical economy- the extent of private control of the new infrastructure; the
winners and losers among the individuals and organizations contending
for the profits of social change; and the rules, if any, constraining the new
forms of political and economic power that change would create.
One result, perhaps predictable, was a flagrant efflorescence of polit-
ical corruption. Through more than a decade of maneuver, the wealthi-
est individuals and corporations in America sought by organized and only
sometimes overtly illegal bribery of parties and officeholders to secure
advantage for themselves and destruction of their competitors. The pri-
mary desideratum was the passage of congressional legislation organizing
the new infrastructure under private rather than public control, and mak-
ing vast free transfers of public property into those private hands to subsi-
dize the development. Money flowed into the political system in quanti-
ties never before imagined. Vast bribes were offered to legislators under
various ingenious forms of transactional camouflage. Armies of lobbyists
operated on Capitol Hill, building regional and inter-regional coalitions
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in support of plans the complexity of whose details surpassed the compre-
hension of the legislators themselves. But the more tangible induce-
ments were sufficient, for the lobbyists controlled both the money and
the nonmonetary facilities essential to the legislators' political survival.
The press, owned by the contending interests and those closely asso-
ciated with them, went to great lengths to de-emphasize the story, not so
much by failure to report (which could hardly occur in such a partisan
environment), as by relentless omission of background and context. The
result was a growing awareness throughout the electorate that the
Congress and Executive were being bought, but without any clear under-
standing of the larger issues at stake, or a real glimpse of the future that
was being constructed for them. Instead, of course, there were the
promises: everyone would benefit from the enormous economic expan-
sion the new infrastructure would bring about, as competition between
titans delivered prosperity, richly expanded markets, and a new vast do-
main of American economic and cultural dominance.
And so-while the people were told no more than half-truths, and
the press purveyed increasingly sophisticated justifications for the un-
leashing of private rapacity on the public patrimony--the contending in-
terests went on buying and unbuying Congressmen, Senators, and party
committees. In the end there was little left to steal and no one left to buy.
In an atmosphere of increasingly acrid but unfocused public distrust, the
Last Great Deal was made, and the Presidency of the United States be-
came the prize whose continued possession by the party in power hinged
on willingness to approve the deal.
Any resemblance between the past and the present is of course
purely accidental. I am describing not the background and enactment of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, but rather the "Great Barbecue" of
railroad legislation in the United States Congress from the Pacific Railway
Act of 1862 to the Texas Pacific land grant and the Presidential
Compromise of 1877.1 But any reader who has already traversed the
many lengthy and erudite contributions to this Symposium, and whose
mind is therefore concentrated on current affairs, might be forgiven a
sense of slightly disoriented familiarity.
A sense of deja vu at the factual level is understandable. The 104th
Congress that ended with the Telecommunications Act began, among
other similar matters, with one of the richest men in the world offering
1. The era of federal giveaways to industrial capitalism was first described as "the
Great Barbecue" by Vernon Parrington in the uncompleted final volume of Main Currents
in American Thought. See Vernon L. Parrington, Beginnings of Critical Realism in America:
1860-1920, at 23-26 (1958). For the most recent scholarship describing the events
narrated here and collecting relevant primary and secondary sources, see Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, at 465-69 (1988). For a
discussion of the complex interrelation between the Texas & Pacific railroad project and
the maneuvering to decide the disputed presidential election of 1876 in favor of
Rutherford Hayes rather than Samuel Tilden, see generally C. Vann Woodward, Reunion
and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction 51-185 (1966).
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$4 million as an advance against potential future book royalties to the
Speaker of the House.2 Each possessor of a VHF television broadcast li-
cense, including the gentleman who certainly did not publicly offer a
bribe to Newt Gingrich, will now receive-at no cost and among many
other benefits-another slice of the publicly-owned electromagnetic spec-
trum in return for adoption of new high-definition television (HDTV)
technology. As I write it appears that actual use of this technology may
not be required in this new portion of the spectrum.3 But then, come to
think of it, actual construction and operation of a railroad often failed to
occur once federal property had been transferred, the last time a newly-
subdued continent was parceled out to Robber Barons.
Naturally there are differences. The global Free Trade Empire the
United States hopes to gain from the winning of the Cold War and the
universal adoption of digital communications is not the precise analog of
the agricultural and mining empire of the West, bound together by the
railroads, that emerged from the Civil War. The Union Pacific is not the
Internet; neither Collis P. Huntington nor Jay Gould was a figure of suffi-
cient triviality to be successfully impersonated by Rupert Murdoch; and
observers of all political persuasions will probably find it tolerably easy to
distinguish between Ulysses S. Grant and Bill Clinton.
But I am not writing an essay about the evil and destructive conse-
quences of Gilded Age political corruption. For now, the point is only
that we have seen the American Republic go through major adjustments
in basic political economy before as a consequence of exploiting new in-
frastructural technology. Intelligent bystanders readily perceive certain
correspondences that would justify inquiry. It is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to avoid the impression that there has been another barbecue going
on.
II. WHERE'S THE SMOKE?
Perhaps it is all so obvious that mention is scarcely necessary. In
most cities of the world-Belgrade comes to mind, for example-it is
2. See David Streitfeld, $4 Million Book Deal for Gingrich: Political Opponents Decry
Windfall from Murdoch Firm, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1994, at Al.
3. Within days of Robert Dole's resignation from the Senate in June 1996, the new
Republican leadership of the Senate joined with Newt Gingrich in a letter demanding that
the FCC issue free licenses for additional broadcasting spectrum, ultimately intended for
high-definition television use., The letter instructed the Commission to issue such licenses
as rapidly as possible, and only to existing licensed television broadcasters, to preclude any
new competition in the television frequencies. See Joel Brinkley, Congress Asks F.C.C. to
Begin Lending Channels for Digital TV Broadcasts, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1996, at D6. On
December 24, 1996, the Commission adopted a technical standard for high-definition
television broadcasting in the United States. See FCC Action Clears Way for Digital
Television; Panel Endorses Video Format; New TVs Likely to Hit Market by 1998,
Baltimore Sun, Dec. 27, 1996, at 2D. As of this writing, the FCC has not issued any order




generally thought to be primarily a political issue who controls the televi-
sion stations. The delicate negotiations between wealthy individuals and
the government over that question are not thought too banal for explicit
comment. The connection between Silvio Berlusconi's ownership of tele-
vision stations aid his political activities was generally made the subject of
pasquinade in Italy, at least elsewhere than on his own stations. 4 Edu-
cated readers among the tiny minority of Americans who actually ac-
quired meaningful information concerning the Telecommunications Act
might consider its long-term political significance both obvious and cen-
tral to any intelligent discussion had it happened, say, in France, Israel, or
Serbia. But those questions do not seem to have been of paramount in-
terest in the discourse on this subject. Not that political economy is a
subject on which the essays in this Review are silent. You have hardly read
anything else. But it has been mostly political economy without cultural
history, as though in analyzing how consent is obtained for systemic
changes that redistribute wealth and power, one need not look beyond
the theory of the firm, mechanical analysis of material incentives, and a
gross equation of increase in aggregate output with social progress. Not
even Marx and Engels were such staunch historical materialists.
I should be clear at this point that I have no intention to accuse
anyone of anything. Heaven knows that the distinguished scholars whose
works you have been reading are not Marxists. Nor has anyone intended
to hide the crude political realities of a process whose results she or he
broadly approves. The scholarship's rather indifferent attitude towards
the larger political issues reveals a more subtle problem. We have ruled
out certain issues, ranges of outcomes, possible modes of organization.
Those decisions constructing the limits of the conversation are so broadly
accepted among the "chattering classes," particularly those whose chat-
tering is sponsored, that the mechanisms by which the alternatives are
ruled undiscussable are themselves considered unworthy of investigation.
These unarticulated assumptions are buried in the language, flying
too low for our radar. The metaphors in which this Symposium's partici-
pants express themselves are those in which we have all been speaking in
the last several years. Beneath the surface of this apparently analytical
rhetoric, so glittering and self-confident, are the realities, burning away
unaffected.
III. A FEw STRAws IN THE WIND
So let us take a few of those metaphors and try to locate the ways in
which the metaphors themselves constrain our imaginations, remove po-
tential objectives, and obscure the perception of political contingencies.
Then, perhaps, we will be able to frame questions that would broaden the
incidence of scholarship.
4. See Frank Viviano, Berusconi Can Keep His Media Empire, Italian Voters Decide,




Railroads are the great public highways of the world, along
which its gigantic currents of trade and travel continually
pour..... They are the most marvelous invention of modem
times .... There is scarcely a want, wish or aspiration of the
human heart, which they do not in some measure help to
gratify.5
Here we are on familiar cultural ground again; our Great Barbecue
too has been constantly advertised in these terms. When did the phrase
"the information superhighway" become ubiquitous for denoting the full
range of the new digital communications technology? By 1995 its pres-
ence was being widely deplored by those whose sensitivities to cliche are
well-developed, 6 but I don't believe I ever saw it criticized for its pervasive
political content.
It is naturally superfluous to point out that American culture glori-
fies the road. Identifying one's product or proposal with the image of the
open road is a sure bet among our most adept cultural promoters. But
the vision of the "highway" has more than undifferentiated positive ap-
peal. The highway is the domain of individualism, the medium of physi-
cal liberty, the antithesis of community. The highway is also, as Justice
Byron Paine's paean to the railroad reminds us, primarily a pathway of
commerce.
Did the widespread metaphor of the highway constrain our thought,
dictating our questions about the Telecommunications Act? Suppose in-
stead that, beginning in the early 1990s, we had all referred to the new
telecommunications technology as "the Universal Education System."
This would have captured a different range of meanings, neither more
nor less correct as a characterization of the new technology. But the shift
of metaphor would surely have affected the political climate. Suppose
along with the Telecommunications Act Congress had considered in
1995 a bill to turn the public schools over to private profit-making organi-
zations seeking advertising opportunities. Such a "reform" of the existing
public educational system would have been highly controversial, I think,
and if media companies and others with an interest in the outcome had
been pouring money into the war chests of candidates, issues of social
justice and democracy would probably have been raised. But the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 concerned only "the Information
Superhighway," not "the Universal Education System," so of course no
one needed to consider such questions or attend to the larger political
implications.
5. Whiting v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167, 219-20 (1870) (Paine,
J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Martin Peretz, Cambridge Diarist: Al Pal, New Republic, Feb. 17, 1997, at
42, 42 ("What Gore first defined as the information superhighway is already a cliche, not
because it is banal but because it is so powerful.").
1997]
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No doubt there are interesting problems best identified by thinking
of the new communications technology as analogous to other systems for
transporting goods. Such an approach encourages concerns with effi-
ciency and security of carriage, application of competition law, relations
with the regulatory agencies, and interactions with general commercial
law. That metaphor, in short, yields the questions asked by the partici-
pants in this Symposium. The metaphor of goods carriage also assists one
in assuming that the things carried are the property of the shipper, ob-
jects in the process of sale. Such an implicit support for the continuance
of traditional intellectual property law is an invaluable subsidy to those
who profit by the nonreform of these antiquated doctrines.
But the metaphor obscures other questions that become identifiable
when the technology is thought of as the system of universal education.
Immediately, inquiry is led to issues of equality of access, locus of editorial
control, development of the labor force, and the relevance of the tech-
nology to the actual conduct of electoral politics. The issue of equal ac-
cess, for one, is raised in the preceding essays; I don't mean to suggest
that metaphors so rigidly control our thinking that nothing can be per-
ceived unless the ideological frame predisposes one to see it. But this is
merely one of the forms in which the vocabulary and imagery of scholar-
ship has worked to underemphasize the political redistribution in
progress.
B. The Broadcaster-Consumer Model
Most of the essays in this volume share a set of categories for dividing
the convergent systems of interpersonal communication. The categories
employed are a familiar component of the larger social discussion of tele-
communications "reform." They have an implicit political content which
the scholarship tends uncritically to accept.
The basic distinction, maintained in the preceding essays, is between
"telephony" and "broadcast." Switched communications between peers
are conceived as private, but everything else tends to be seen as the pur-
view of broadcast. This dichotomy expresses an unarticulated intention
to cast the information society in an industrial mold. We can all call Aunt
Sally, but only a few of us are "broadcasters," industrial producers of sig-
nal, which all the rest of us merely consume.
This is a metaphor only. As a metaphor it captures some aspects of
the reality it describes. But one of the most important properties of the
new technology is that it eliminates the previously high cost of reaching a
large audience. Any individual can, through the use of network media
such as the World Wide Web, reach an audience far larger than the
owner of several small television stations, and at no cost. The form of
communication achieved is no doubt different, and it is obvious that the
individual UseNet news post has not achieved parity with a television ad-
vertisement for an athletic shoe. But the metaphor of the broadcaster
and the consumer conditions us to accept the maximum possible inequal-
[Vol. 97:945
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ity as a natural necessity: a few talk and the rest merely listen. Spectrum
need not be allocated around this conception; the historical justifications
for doing so are among the forms of reasoning vitiated by the rise of
complementary carriage technologies and the resulting death of "scarcity
rationales."
Naturally, the broadcaster model is favored by those whose economic
interests it favors. The broadcasters and the politicians each have some-
thing to offer the other, and both eschew thoughtways that would reduce
the value of what they have to trade. That's how barbecue guest lists are
made. But scholarship has a duty to transcend such self-serving limita-
tions of discussion.
To be sure, broadcasters have been seen, much like railroads, as busi-
nesses "'affected with a public interest."' 7 This view arose, as with the
railroads themselves, only in small part because they have been built on
public real estate. At bottom, I think we can all agree, they are so "af-
fected" because they have become essential social facilities. As far as
broadcasters are concerned, the public interest is that they are the pri-
mary news distribution system for all but a few. Broadcasters through
most of the period since 19348 responded to this perception of a public
interest affecting their business by occasionally trying to act like journal-
ists. The presence of a money-losing news department dignified a televi-
sion network. It was taken to constitute some sort of guarantee that the
network understood its own importance, and intended to respond benev-
olently to those who were dependent on it. Privilege begat noblesse oblige.
Broadcasters waxed publicly proud of their role. The First
Amendment seemed to them to mean that Congress shouldn't mess with
the people's right to speak, or with their right to be the press. The peo-
ple have some rights, and "the press" has others. Like the distinction
between "telephony" and "broadcast," come to think of it. Metaphor
structures conception.
And what of the alternatives? The technological changes we experi-
ence could tend towards the reduction or elision of the distinction be-
tween broadcasters and consumers. Like the "Universal Education
System," an alternate metaphor of "Every Person Her Own Producer"
would capture a different but no less true aspect of technological
possibility.
If we are one generation away from a society where everyone can
feasiblely contribute to informing the people and debating the issues
without mediation, is this a good time to confirm and expand the award
of free communications privileges conveying enormous unequal advan-
7. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 118, 126 (1876) (citation omitted).
8. 1934 was the year in which the Communications Act passed, establishing the FCC.
See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-613 (1994)). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is an amendment to the 1934
Act. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) 56 (to be codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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tage to a few individuals and organizations? Is it relevant that those hold-
ing the privileges then sell to politicians the communications advantages
awarded to them, as well as donate money to the campaigns and personal
fortunes of the legislators? Trying to answer these questions will lead one
straight to the barbecue. But the metaphor of the broadcaster, uncriti-
cally accepted, makes the questions seem less important to ask. After all,
thus it has always been. Why should tomorrow be different? Besides, we
all hope Rupert Murdoch will contribute to the Cyberlaw Center we
would like to build at our law school. The rather oppressive embrace of
the consumer by the broadcaster has truly carried us, haplessly, into "The
Sponsored Life."9
C. The Market for Eyeballs
This graceful metaphor, seemingly a fugitive from the repertoire of
bioethics hypotheticals, is frequently heard in scholarly conversation
about the Telecommunications Act, though it appears more seldom on
the page. The basic idea it expresses has become conventional. Deregu-
lating the market for eyeballs, allowing components of the telecommuni-
cations industry access to one another's core businesses for the presenta-
tion of consumers to advertisers, is welcomed by other contributors to
this Symposium, with or without reference to the illuminating metaphor.
Again there are political assumptions buried inarticulate in the meta-
phor, ones which scholarship should devote itself to recognizing and cri-
tiquing. There is, first, the amplification of the broadcaster-consumer
model. The consumer, in this metaphor, is further reduced to a passive
receptor, an eyeball, whose sole function is to take cognizance of advertis-
ing. But the passivity described in this metaphor does more than parallel
the assumption underlying the division of the world into broadcasters
and consumers. More generally, it supports a bias in favor of "push" over
"pull." Once we have been characterized as eyeballs rather than active
intelligences, after all, media designed to force images and information
at us, rather than to respond to our requests, seem perfectly natural. The
model of "consumer choice" (another metaphor that would repay recur-
sive analysis) becomes the television remote control. Call it, to maintain
the anatomical theme, "the market for eyeballs and forefingers."
Once unpacked, the idea of the market for eyeballs reminds us that
the ultimate resource being tapped by the "liberalized" or deregulated
communications enterprises is human attention. The environment in
which most people live and work is dominated by communications arti-
facts, from the television that consumes hours of every average American
day to the networked computer that constitutes the center of an increas-
ing proportion of work lives. Those artifacts both engage our attention
and coerce it. The rules that determine how content is allocated among
9. The phrase comes from the title of Leslie Savan's perceptive book, The Sponsored
Life: Ads, TV, and American Culture (1994).
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those carriers are to a remarkable extent constitutive of the fabric of our
lives.
In this context, the "market for eyeballs" metaphor signifies and jus-
tifies rules that turn over this basic texture of our lives to the competitive
hum of instructions to consume. Friendly software built into your
Microsoft operating system will soon contain "push" technology to show
you forty unsolicited advertisements an hour on the computer in your
office,' 0 while the commercial video feed in your child's school mingles
"news" about the latest Disney movie to be discussed in English class with
ajuice advertisement your child's peers wrote in order to win the scholar-
ship that makes it possible to go to a better school." The cultural histori-
ans of the future will cast about in the printed detritus of our time for a
sufficiently arresting image of how we rushed to use the new technology
to smother the quiet uniqueness of our inner lives beneath the roar of
advertising bilge. One or more particularly insightful writers will, I pre-
dict, seize on the quaintness of that expression of 1996, when the whole
thing began: "the market for eyeballs." Says it all, don't you think?
IV. PICKING THE BoNEs
What troubles and disappoints me, then, about the contributions to
this collection is the thinness of the political and cultural description they
offer of the fateful moment through which we have just passed. Their
language of description-the jargon of lawyers' political economy--both
implies and seems to enjoin political passivity. It relegates us to the role
of "consumer," reifies the "broadcaster" as a social power in the future as
well as the past, and celebrates as though unproblematic the dominance
of commerce and entertainment over education and empowerment as
uses of the new media. The language itself embodies the assumptions
and exclusions the legislation furthered. The legislation, as I have sug-
gested, was the outcome of political finagling on a scale of rapacity and
flagrant corruption unseen in America for well over a century. And if the
language of our scholarship reproduces the statute's cultural assump-
tions, is our scholarship so tainted as well?
It is hard, on the basis of the papers one reads here, to be optimistic.
The authors have not asked how the Telecommunications Act could have
strengthened the hard-pressed American educational system at the ex-
pense of the muck merchants. They have not asked how the intellectual
passivity encouraged by our beloved broadcasters could be reversed by
the design of new media, and how those new media-rather than pres-
ently existing commercial television-could have been fostered by a dif-
10. Wired, Mar. 1997, at 12.
11. See Melanie Wells, Marketers Go to School; Companies Test New Ground to Sell
Products; Ad Pitches Target Teen Consumers, USA Today, May 9, 1996, at IB; Snapple
Beverage Corp., 'Make A Snapple@ Commercial Contest' Offers $30,000 in First Time Ever




ferent legislative act. They have not critiqued the biased and partial met-
aphors of "the superhighway," "scarcity," "consumer choice," or the
"market for eyeballs." They have not even asked, by and large, whether
the Telecommunications Act made the relations between corporate
wealth and electoral politics even more unhealthy than they were before.
They have treated political economy as though it were not, even in part,
about how culture secures the power of the few over the many.
But in 1996 our culture was corruptly given away, probably for at
least one generation, to those who had the money to buy our politics.
The buyers' resulting measure of control over the way we think will pay
them swingeing and unjust dividends, which they will use to corrupt our
politics further. The writers who have participated in this Symposium
have had fine seats at this greatest of barbecues; they were there from the
slaughtering to the final greasy slurp. Yet they have returned from the
feast to tell us that they were unable to smell the smoke, or to see the
carcasses of future opportunity that have vanished down the gullets of our
new Robber Barons. Their bewilderment would probably amuse us, and
cause some rumination on the quality of the whiskey and cigars, were it
not so likely that the aftereffects of this barbecue would resemble those of
the last:
Suspicious commoners with better eyes than manners discov-
ered the favoritism of the waiters and drew attention to the dif-
ference between their own meager helpings and the heaped-up
plates of more favored guests. It appeared indeed that there was
gross discrimination in the service .... Then at last came the
reckoning. When the bill was sent in to the American people
the farmers discovered that they had been put off with the gib-
lets while the capitalists were consuming the turkey. They
learned that they were no match at a barbecue for more
voracious guests, and as they went home unsatisfied, a sullen an-
ger burned in their hearts that was to express itself later in fierce
agrarian revolts. 12
Parrington's concern should be ours. The Second Great Barbecue will
shape our culture for decades to come. If it breeds further social inequal-
ity, the bitterness and anger of the losers will be furious indeed.
12. Parrington, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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